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Abstract 
One of the primary flaws with current digital signature 
technology is that a digital signature does not “feel” or 
resemble a traditional seal or personal signature to the 
human observer; lacking a sense of visualisation and 
changing each time it is applied.  This paper reviews the 
historical value of seals in Eastern and Western cultures to 
provide a basis to enhance global acceptability of existing 
digital signatures.  The functionality of traditional seals is 
investigated in broad terms, encompassing newly 
established applications to accommodate digital signature 
technology, and traditional seal principles.  Traditional 
seal certificates are employed to prevent the fraudulent use 
of the seal and serve to bind a particular identity with a 
particular seal in some Eastern countries, for instance, 
Taiwan, Japan and Korea.  This usage is analogous to the 
purpose of current digital certificates.   
This proposal develops the concept of integrating a seal 
certificate into an overall digital certificate.  Verification of 
a document by visualisation is done by affixing a visual 
seal within a document and then digitally signing the 
document.  Incorporating the seal images into digital 
certificates ensures the integrity of the seal images applied 
to digital signatures.  This paper defines new private 
extensions to the X.509 v3 certificate structure and 
explains the new digital signing and verifying process.  
The purpose of this proposed solution is to fulfil the 
cultural gap between traditional seals and digital signatures 
through the integration of culturally relevant built-in 
features for increasing the acceptability of digital 
signatures in global e-commerce, while maintaining the 
security features of current digital signature schemes. 
Keywords: seals, seal certificate, e-commerce, digital 
signatures, visualisation, security, verification.1
1 Introduction 
Seals are universal and play significant roles in both 
Western and Eastern cultures.  In the Bible, seals and 
signets were used for integrity, identification, ratification, 
and authority purposes.  For example, in the Old Testament, 
Jeremiah bought the field of Hanameel from his uncle’s 
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son.  Jeremiah signed the land title deed and sealed it. 
(Jeremiah 32:9-15)  Not only does the seal represent the 
identity of the parties, but also evidence of consent 
between the parties and a legal binding to a deed.   Even 
though the West no longer uses individual seals to the same 
degree, some contracts and official documentation still 
require and bear seals.  For instance, the on-line legal 
dictionary, FindLaw (1996), gives a definition of “contract 
under seal” such as:  
“a contract that does not require consideration in 
order to be binding but that must be sealed, delivered, 
and show a clear intention of the parties to create a 
contract under seal” 
Moreover, an agreement made by deed, as opposed to a 
contract, requires a seal.  Though seals no longer play a 
role in many modern individual and business situations, 
the principles of their function remain in all aspects of 
society; seals having been replaced by handwritten 
signatures.  However, signatures and tangible ink seals are 
highly impractical within the e-commerce environment, so 
the new digital signature must reflect the individuality 
inherent in the signing processes they have rendered 
obsolete.   
In Imperial Chinese history, the importance of seals is 
summarised in an ancient saying, “authority exists only 
when a seal is present; once a seal is revoked, authority 
perishes as well”.  Within the Chinese community, 
business and personal seals are commonly used in daily 
life and for business transactions.  Keating (1995) reveals 
that a person is not required to be present to sign official 
documents as long as the correct seal is present.  Moreover, 
if the individual is present but their seal is absent, the 
signing process cannot be carried out.  Thus it is the seal 
that is more important.  He also points out that, for 
business practices, the seal serves as a person’s signature 
and when affixed in red ink is legally binding in all 
business issues.  Both works highlight the importance of 
seals within Western and Chinese cultures.   
Nowadays, the shift towards e-commerce is an inevitable 
trend.  Digital signatures (Rivest et al. 1978) are designed 
in e-commerce to fulfil the functions of traditional seals or 
signatures for authentication, data integrity, and 
non-repudiation purposes.  Historically, documents always 
relied on a recognisable visual stimulus for verification.  
However, one of the primary problems with current digital 
signatures is that a digital signature does not “feel” like or 
resemble a traditional seal to the human observer, as it 
does not have the same sense of visualisation.  Currently, 
digital signatures such as the PGP (Pretty Good Privacy)  
digital signatures (Callas et al. 1998) are attached to the 
end of a computer document as a stream of binary data.   
These are then displayed in hexadecimal nature form 
which appears to the average user as a long 
incomprehensible string of random characters offering no 
sense of identity or ownership.  Additionally, digital 
signatures change each time they are applied, unlike 
traditional seals that are constant personal identifiers 
associated with individual signatories to facilitate 
verification.  Moreover, the image of the seal, in paper 
transactions, is indelibly attached to the document.   
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The current digital signature overlooks the importance of 
visualisation and sense of personal identity and ownership 
in many cultures.  To overcome the cultural gap between 
the traditional seals/signatures and digital signatures, this 
work investigates seal cultures in the context of digital 
signatures, identifying the need to develop a new 
culturally friendly, visual digital signature.  This proposal 
makes the currently intangible digital signature virtually 
tangible; i.e., it incorporates visualisation into the current 
digital signature practice.  The purpose of this work is to 
increase the acceptability of digital signatures in global 
e-commerce while maintaining the security features of the 
current digital signature. 
In section 2, previous related works are examined.  These 
include a discussion of the cultural issues associated with 
existing digital signature schemes, in section 2.1; an 
analysis of the related work based on pre-existing 
principles of traditional seals, altered to serve 
contemporary functions within the digital signing 
environment, in section 2.2; and then an illustration of 
traditional seal certificates in relation to public key 
certificate X.509 (ITU-T 2000) is given in section 2.3.  
Section 3 consists of the proposed extensions to the X.509 
certificate and offers an explanation of the new signing 
and verifying process.  The analysis of this work is 
incorporated in section 4.  Finally, the conclusion is drawn 
and future direction for work is discussed in section 5.   
2 Related Work 
2.1 Digital Signatures with Cultural Issues 
Fillingham (1997) believes traditional signatures will not 
be completely replaced by digital signatures, given the 
limitations of digital signatures.  These limitations include 
for instance, long-standing retention issues in terms of the 
deterioration of the associated storage media, 
obsolescence of the data format and the evolution of 
cryptographic algorithms, related standards and certificate 
validation.  He also maintains that digital signatures will 
never be used in ceremonial or historical events, although 
this may be accepted.  Lutterbeck (2000) states digital 
signatures fail to meet high expectations for their success 
due to the simple flaw that they overlook cultural factors.  
He advocates that before digital signatures can prevail, an 
appropriate sense of culture must be incorporated into 
digital signatures in terms of user acceptance and 
long-term stability and reliability.  Lutterbeck believes that 
the culture of seals in Japan is well suited for the 
implementation of digital signatures, since the concept of 
seal certificates and electronic certificates are comparable.  
Both Fillingham and Lutterbeck investigate the use of 
traditional seals/signatures and expose the flaws in current 
digital signatures.  However, their work fails to exploit the 
concept of traditional seals/signatures to innovate a 
culturally friendly digital signature regime.  
2.2 Digital Signing within Existing Trust Based 
Environments 
There is at least one major form of attack on current digital 
signature schemes; i.e., the document displayed to the 
signer may be different from the actual one signed.  This 
has been called the “What you see is what you signed” or 
WYSIWYS problem (Spalka et al. 2001).  Researchers at 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) Laboratories, Balacheff et al. 
(2001), answer this type of attack by deploying an 
additional piece of tamper resistant hardware, the Trusted 
Displayed Controller (TDC), with its own display circuitry 
and cryptographic functions in a computer system.  A TDC 
controls the platform’s screen, preventing software from 
learning the specifics of displayed data.  Once the TDC is 
authenticated by the signer’s smart card, the signer can 
trust the platform to perform digital signing.   
HP employs a trusted image, which they call a “seal”, 
stored in the smart card that the TDC will display as a 
background or a border.  Under normal circumstances, one 
computer has only one display screen, hence this seal is 
used to indicate to the signer that the TDC is controlling 
the display that users are signing with their smart cards. 
Microsoft’s NGSCB (Next Generation Secure Computing 
Base) (Carroll et al. 2002) proposes a similar solution to 
resist Trojan Horse Viruses.  NGSCB provides the regular 
Windows environment as well as a trusted processing 
environment that enables users to perform confidential 
tasks while protecting data from being read or written by 
non-trusted applications.  To allow the user to distinguish 
between a secure window and an unsecured window, the 
secure window will include a recognisable image or 
information displayed within a border.  
Both HP’s (Balacheff et al. 2001), and Microsoft’s 
(Carroll et al. 2002) proposals use a recognisable symbol 
only known to the signer, referred to as a “seal”, for 
verification of a secured environment on the screen display.  
This seal is displayed on the screen along with the data that 
is to be signed, so that the signer can be confident that 
he/she is working in a highly trusted environment.  HP’s 
solution also suggests that the signer needs to change the 
seal image periodically to prevent the image from being 
compromised.  Their idea of a seal is not a constant token 
associated with the signer; they use the principles of 
traditional seals but for a different purpose.  The private 
image is purely a security verification scheme and takes no 
place in an actual document or transaction.  Our proposed 
seal images are permanent fixtures of digital signatures; 
functioning as a constant visual token associated with the 
signer and a document, just like a traditional seal for 
signing and verification.  The Certificate Authority (CA) 
digitally verifies the integrity of the seal as discussed 
below in section 4.1; therefore the signer is not required to 
periodically update their seal images.   
2.3 Traditional Seal Certificate 
Formal documents are sealed in lieu of being signed as part 
of Chinese custom and culture.  Seal certificates are the 
integrity mechanism employed for prevention of 
fraudulent seal use.  Seal certificates are adopted in Asian 
countries, such as Taiwan, Japan and Korea, functioning 
as a notarisation or witnessing activity in the signing 
process to provide reasonable evidence of authenticity to 
the general public.  Prior to Taiwan abolished the seal 
certificate system in July 2003 (Chinesetimes 2003), 
execution of some legal documents required the 
presentation of the registered seal and the seal certificate, 
such as in stock assignments and real estate transactions.  
Figure 1 shows a seal certificate that proves the binding of 
the seal owner’s identity to the registered seal through 
endorsement by the seal of the Registration Authority and 
the seal of the Registration Authority executive.  The 
elements of the seal certificate in Figure 1 include: (1) the 
name of the jurisdictional household registration authority, 
in this case the Ling-Ya Judicial Area Household 
Authority, (2) seal owner information including name, 
date of birth, ID number and address, (3) the owner’s seal, 
(4) seal registration date, (5) the seal of the issuing 
authority, namely the seal of Ling-Ya Household 
Authority, (6) the seal of the relevant executive of the 
Authority, and (7) certificate issue date.  The function of a 
seal certificate is to authenticate the signer through a 
trustworthy third party similar to the CA within a Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
2.4 Digital Certificate 
A digital certificate consists of a data structure for binding 
subjects to public key values and is digitally signed by a 
trusted third party.  There are various types of digital 
certificates (also known as public key certificates), such as,  
PKIX X.509 (ITU-T 2000), PGP certificates (Callas et al. 
1998) and SPKI (Simple Public Key Infrastructure) 
certificates (Ellison et al. 1999).  The X.509 v3 certificate 
is the most prevalent type in the marketplace, boasting 
comparable features to a seal certificate.  Thus, this paper 
concentrates on the proposal for new extensions to the 
X.509 v3 certificate.  The extensions of X.509 v3 are used 
to convey additional attributes associated with users or 
public keys and for certificate hierarchy management.  
Each extension in a certificate is attributed as critical or 
non-critical.  When an extension is assigned as critical, it 
must be recognized by the relying party, otherwise the 
certificate is rejected.  A non-critical extension may, 
however, be ignored if it is not recognized.  Extensions to 
X.509 v3 include standard and private extensions that can 
be defined for specific use by communities.  This proposal 
aims to define a specification for a visualised X.509 
certificate by use of these private extensions, which are 
compatible with PKIX requirements. 
3 Solution 
Existing digital signature schemes overlook the impact 
provided through visualisation as a force for detection and 
communication.  In particular, when the seal itself is 
visually recognisable on a global scale, for example, the 
trademarks of Coca Cola and McDonalds, the verifier can 
accept the signatory’s seal in a confident and expedient 
manner.  This paper exploits the concept of traditional 
seals and seal certificates prevalent in some seal-culture 
countries, like Taiwan, to develop the visualisation of 
digital signatures.  Explicitly, the primary purposes of this 
work are to visualise current digital signatures and digital 
certificates.  The X.509 v3 certificate allows communities 
to define private extensions to carry distinctive 
information.  This paper defines two data structures, 
including the subject’s seal and issuer’s seal in X.509 v3 
private extensions, to support the proposed visualised 
digital signature scheme.  Thus visualised digital signature 
applications will be able to accept visualised digital 
certificates for use.  The visualised digital certificate is 
defined in accordance with X.509. As stated by RFC3280, 
the extension specifications of X.509 v3 each include an 
OID (Object Identifier) and an ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax 
Notation One) structure.  The OIDs of the extensions 
proposed in this work could be registered with a 
registration authority and lead in to the following.  In the 
next section, we will define these ANS.1 structures for the 
seal of the subject and the seal of the issuer, and then show 
the new signing and verifying processes using these 
innovations.  
3.1 Structure of Subject’s Seal 
This sub-section specifies the format and content of a 
subject’s seal as one of the proposed private extensions to 
X.509 v3 in relation to RFC3280.  The concepts are based 
upon standard legal practice in Taiwan as these seem to 
have universal applicability.  The structure of a subject’s 
seal contains the seal type, authorising authority, creation 
date, seal creator, description, file format, seal name, file 
name and the contents of the image file.  When the image 
and its related information are presented to the issuing CA 
for verification, the subject’s seal type identifies whether 
the subject’s seal is a personal, corporate, governmental or 
application seal.  If the seal type is not personal, the 
authorising authority must be present to reveal who 
authorised the creation of the seal as a record of 
accountability.  The seal creator’s identity is also included 
for liability purposes should a challenge arise.  Since the 
seal owner may apply different seals for various purposes; 
the name of the subject seal allows the specification of the 
of each seal’s identity.  Other relevant comments can be 
placed into the description field.  There are various graphic 
formats available to present a seal, thus file format is a 
critical attribute to specify the image format used in the 
data structure of the subject’s seal.   The data stream of the 
seal image is the essence of the subject’s seal.  The file 
name forms part of the seal image of the integrity needs for 
the seal image, making their verification by the issuing CA 
essential.  The contents of a subject’s seal are given in 
Figure2.   
 SubjectSeal            ::=  SEQUENCE 
{ 
subjectSealType          Sealtype, 
authorisingAuthority     Name      OPTIONAL,
subjectSealCreatedDate   Time, 
subjectSealCreator   BMPString, 
description              BMPString OPTIONAL,
subjectFileFormat        Imageformat 
subjectSealName          BMPString OPTIONAL,
subjectSealFileName      UTF8String, 
subjectSealDataStream    BIT STRING, 
} 
Subjectsealtype ::= BIT STRING   
{ 
personal         (0), 
corporate   (1), 
governmental  (2), 
application  (3) 
} 
Imageformat  ::=  CHOICE 
{ 
jpeg           [0] GraphicString, 
gif            [1] GraphicString, 
bmp            [2] GraphicString, 
tiff           [3] GraphicString 
} 
Time          ::=  CHOICE 
{ 
utcTime                UTCTime, 
generalTime   GeneralizedTime 
} 
Figure2 data structure of subject’s seal 
A description of each field is given below: 
 subjectSealType:  
This field identifies the particular seal from a list of 
alternative types of seal including personal, corporate, 
governmental and application. 
 authorisingAuthority:  
When the value of subjectSealType is “personal”, then 
the authorisingAuthority field is not required; since 
normally the creation of a personal seal does not 
require the approval of authorities.  The 
authorisingAuthority field must be present if the 
subjectSealType field is not set to “personal”, to 
specify who authorises the creation of the seal as a 
method of accountability.  Corresponding to RFC3280, 
the two basic certificate fields of X.509 v3, issuer and 
subject, are defined as the X.501 type Name, which is 
identical to this authorisingAuthority field.   
 subjectSealCreatedDate 
This field specifies when the seal image was created.  
It is defined as a Time type that has a choice of 
UTCTime or GeneralizedTime as the ASN.1 standard 
for dates and time.  
 subjectSealCreator 
This field is a string identifying the seal’s creator as a 
record for any accountability needs.  It is classified as a 
BMPString type.  In fact, BMP (Basic Multilingual 
Plane), defined in (ISO/IEC 1993), is designed to 
convey special characters in all scripts, for instance, 
Latin, Cyrillic, Greek, Arabic, and Han.  RFC 3280 
states that BMPString is one of the subtypes of the 
UNIVERSAL types of strings in 1988 ASN.1. 
 description 
The description field is an optional string that contains 
specific comments on the subject’s seal. 
 subjectFileFormat 
The seal image types that this work proposes are the 
current major image types available and compatible 
with most computer platforms, applications, and 
common Web browsers; including GIF, JPEG, BMP 
and TIFF (CDL 2003).  The image sizes of GIFs and 
JPEG type data records are more compact than TIFFs 
and BMPs, making them well-suited to be candidates 
for onscreen seal images while minimising 
transmission latency.  However, while JPEG 
compression provides a larger compression ratio for 
images than other types of compression, the original 
detail of an image is unrecoverable once the image has 
been compressed.  Generally, a seal image can be a 
monochrome impression bearing the user’s mark or 
the name and thus does not require the provision for 
millions of colours.  Thus the size of seal images is 
usually relatively small.  TIFF and BMP formats are 
also included among the choices for seal image types 
and are provided the conforming applications can 
recognise these image data type.  
 subjectSealName 
This field is an optional string that allows specifying 
the identity of the seal, particularly when the seal 
owner may possess multiple seals.    
 subjectSealFileName  
Corresponding to RFC 3280, all certificates issued 
after December 31, 2003 MUST use the UTF8String 
encoding of DirectoryString. Thus, this field is an 
UTF8String that specifies the file name of the subject’s 
seal.   
 subjectSealdDataStream  
This field contains the data content of the subject’s seal 
image. 
3.2 Structure of Issuer’s Seal 
The issuer’s seal is displayed on the visualised digital 
certificate with the subject’s seal for testimony, which is 
comparable with the traditional seal certificate that the 
issuing authority’s seal is applied to as a testament to the 
owner’s seal.  This sub-section denotes the data structure 
of the issuer’s seal as another proposed private extension 
to X.509 v3 (RFC3280), including seal creation date, seal 
creator, description, file format, seal name, file name and 
the contents of the image file.  The creator and created date 
of the issuer’s seal are retained as a record of liability.  The 
certificate issuer may have various seals for use; therefore 
the identity of the seal can be given in the name of the 
issuer’s seal field.  A number of different types of graphic 
formats exist; hence it is important to indicate the image 
format in the specification.  The data stream of the seal 
image is the principle element of this data structure.  The 
file name is part of the integrity needs for the issuer’s seal.  
The issuer itself digitally signs them.  The structure of the 
issuer’s seal is given in Figure4.  
 Issuserseal            ::=  SEQUENCE   
 { 
issuerSealCreatedDate    Time, 
issuerSealCreator        BMPString, 
description              BMPString OPTIONAL,
issuerSealFileFormat     Imageformat, 
issuerSealName           BMPString OPTIONAL,
issuerSealFileName       UTF8String, 
issuerSealDatastream     BIT STRING 
 } 
Figure4 Data structure of issuer’s seal 
A description of each field is given below: 
 issuerSealCreatedDate 
The description of this field is similar to the 
subjectSealCreatedDate field described above.   
 issuerSealCreator  
This field corresponds to the subjectSealCreator field 
of the subject’s seal structure.  
 description 
This field is an optional string that contains specific 
comments regarding the issuer’s seal.   
 issuerSealFileFormat 
This field corresponds to the subjectSealFileFormat 
field of the subject’s seal structure.   
 issuerSealName 
This field is an optional string that specifies the 
identity of the issuer’s seal when the issuer may own 
multiple seals for various reasons.   
 issuerSealFileName 
This field is an UTF8String that specifies the issuer’s 
seal name .   
 issuerSealDatastream 
This field contains the data content of the issuer’s seal 
image.   
3.3 A New Digital Signing Process 
A seal image can be generated by any image-editing 
program or through a scanner.  The contents of a seal 
image can include an impression bearing a mark or a name, 
like the inscriptions used to generate traditional seals, 
which is a distinctive and recognisable constant token to 
the signer.  The seal image and its related information 
containing seal type, seal authorising authority, seal 
creator, relevant description, seal image format, seal size 
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and seal file name are presented to the issuing CA for 
registration.  After the CA certifies the seal image, the new 
public key certificate is issued, and the seal image can be 
incorporated into the digital signature.  As figure3 
illustrates, the process of creating a visually sealed and 
digitally signed document consists of:  
Step 1: create a document in a word processing program, 
for example;   
Step 2: importing the registered signer’s seal image into 
the text to affix the seal to the document; 
Step 3: placing the visually sealed document into the hash 
function to produce the message digest code, that 
is, its “digital fingerprint”;  
Step 4: encrypting the digital fingerprint with the signer’s 
private key to generate the digital signature 
This is analogous to the traditional paper-based signing 
process; in which a seal is affixed upon a document, and 
thus it’s content, that is obvious to the signer.  This new 
signing process is designed to simulate traditional signing 
techniques incorporating visualisation into digital signing.  
In seal-culture societies, when parties want to formalise a 
contract, the seals are affixed and the seal certificates are 
also attached to the contract for authentication, data 
integrity and non-repudiation purposes.  By the same 
token, with the new digital signing process, the public key 
certificate is transmitted with a visually sealed and 
digitally signed document for the same purposes.  
3.4 A New Digital Signature Verification Process 
Figure 5 depicts the new signature verification process.  
The new signature verification process is analogous to the 
traditional, sealed paper–based document with the seal 
certificate for verification attached.  When the recipient 
receives a visually sealed and digitally signed document 
with an associated digital certificate, the recipient 
immediately perceives the claimed signer’s seal on the 
document, particularly when the signer’s seal is 
recognisable to the verifier.  This would be the case, in 
particular, where regular business transactions between 
parties occur. Importantly, the signatory’s digital 
certificate, signed by the CA, should be displayed on the 
screen along with the received sealed and signed document 
to facilitate verification.  The recipient then verifies the 
document in the same way as a digital signature, which is 
to place the received signed document into a hash function 
regenerating the digital fingerprint.  The digital signature 
is decrypted with the signer’s public key to restore the 
digital fingerprint generated by the signer.  If two digital 
fingerprints are equivalent then the document is 
authenticated, otherwise the document has been altered 
during the transmission.  
The signer’s seal image on the signed document greatly 
increases the verifier’s confidence that the signed 
document is from the originator.  Furthermore, both the 
issuing CA’s and the signer’s seal images on the public 
key certificate instill confidence that the signer’s public 
key is attested to by the CA, unlike the current digital 
signature’s verification process of presentation of long 
meaningless hexadecimal strings to the verifier.   
4 Analysis 
This section evaluates the quality of service of this 
proposed visualised digital signature and visualised digital 
certificate scheme with respects to integrity, security, 
interoperability, and performance.   
4.1 Integrity 
Public key certificates provide assurance that the public 
key is associated with a particular entity.  By the same 
token, the strategy of ensuring the integrity and 
authenticity of seal images is to employ public key 
certificates.  This is the mechanism binding the visualised 
seal image and other related seal information in addition to 
the public key and other associated information to the 
declared entity, before it is digitally signed with the private 
key of the issuing CA.  Figure 6 compares the structures of 
a current certificate and the new proposed certificate.  The 
newly designed public key certificate comprises the 
original three components together with the subject’s 
identity, subject’s public key, and issuer’s added 
information as well as the extensions including: 
 the subject’s seal image and the seal related details 
containing seal type, seal authorising authority, seal 
creator, relevant description, seal image format, seal 
size and seal file name, and 
 the issuer’s image and its seal related information. 
The four components are hashed and then signed by the 
private key of the issuer to ensure the integrity of the 
subject’s public key with the designed visualised seal 
images. 
4.2 Security 
This proposal still requires the verifier to execute the 
digital signature verification process to validate the 
received visualised digital signature instead of only 
relying on the visual tokens for verification.  Moreover, 
this proposal maintains the security features of current 
digital signature schemes, hence potential form of attacks 
on digital signature applications may still arise, such as, 
the WYSIWYS problem (Spalka et al. 2001) and a 
Signature Stripping attack (McCullagh et al. 2001), (i.e., a 
digital signature can be removed without leaving a trace 
and replaced with a new one by a fraud).    Actually, our 
solution does not prevent the occurrence of Signature 
Stripping attack.  However, the visualisation of digital 
signatures makes a Signature Stripping Attack harder to 
deploy, since people are much better at identifying a visual 
symbol on a signed document.  Likewise it is easier to use 
a certificate with the issuer’s and signatory’s seal images 
for verification than attempting to verify an existing digital 
signature without any tangible visual stimulus.   
4.3 Interoperability 
According to RFC 3280, each extension in a X.509 v3 
certificate is attributed as critical or non-critical.  When an 
extension is assigned as critical, the relying party, as a 
result of rejecting the certificate, may not recognize it.  The 
proposed visualised seal images are integrated into the 
private extensions of X.509 v3.  Hence, to prevent loss of 
interoperability, the assignments of the proposed 
visualised seal data fields in the extensions are marked 
“non-critical”.  
4.4 Performance 
Two proposed private extensions containing subject’s and 
issuer’s seal images are incorporated into theX509 v3 
certificate, which may cause slightly more transmission 
latency than the current transmission of the existing public 
key certificate.  In order to minimise the transmission 
latency, a compact size for image formats is desirable.  
However, high compression ratio of some image formats 
that result in a loss of the fidelity of the original image 
should be carefully evaluated when selecting the seal 
image format.  Generally a seal bears a mark or a name, 
which does not require the provision of millions of colours; 
thus the sizes of seal images should generally be relatively 
small, e.g., the digitised form of a manual signature made 
in black ink.  In addition, transmission bandwidth is 
increasing with evolving technology, effectively 
nullifying this small increase in latency.  Therefore, the 
integration of visualised seal images into digital signatures 
and digital certificates should not be a major issue for 
transmission.   
5 Conclusion and future work 
Previous work addressed the cultural gap between digital 
signatures and traditional signatures/seals.  However 
unsolved cultural issues still remain with regards to the use 
of modern digital signatures within these societies.  Other 
work has referred to a visual “seal” or image as a 
verification of the trustworthy nature of a screen display, 
not as a constant token associated with the signer. These 
schemes do use the principle of traditional seals but for 
different purposes.  This work bridges the cultural gap 
between traditional seals/signatures and modern digital 
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signatures and allows the signer to embrace the 
consistency of the digital seal.  This research examines the 
historical values and applications of seals in Western and 
Eastern cultures and resolves the cultural issues by 
emulating the traditional signing and verification 
techniques within the digital signing process.  Not only do 
we propose a visualised digital signature, but also that a 
new public key digital certificate contain the issuer’s and 
signatory’s seal images to facilitate verification.  This 
work makes existing intangible digital signatures and 
digital certificates virtually tangible, which will greatly 
increase user acceptability of digital signatures among the 
global populace.   
The mechanism of ensuring the integrity and authenticity 
of seal images is to incorporate the signatory’s seal image 
into the X.509 v3 certificate in relation to RFC3280. 
Explicitly the public key, the seal image and associated 
information are digitally signed by the issuing CA.  New 
extensions to the private extensions of X.509 v3 are 
defined, including the data structures of both the subject’s 
seal and issuer’s seal.  The proposed private extensions 
may not be recognised by the verifier’s system; hence the 
assignments of the proposed visualised seals in the 
extensions are marked “non-critical”, to prevent loss of 
interoperability.  It is suggested that the visualised seals be 
incorporated into X.509 v3 certificates, but not be limited 
to X.509 v3.  With further study, this design may be also 
be incorporated into other types of certificates, such as, 
SPKI certificates, PGP certificates, Attribute certificates, 
and Cross certificates (RFC3280), where appropriate.  
This work exploits the concept of traditional seals and seal 
certificates to develop visualisation of digital signatures.  
Nevertheless, the proposal emanating from this research 
does not add undue complexity and still maintains the 
original security features of the existing digital signatures.  
At present, this paper defines the data structures to X.509 
v3 extensions, a prototype system will be developed and 
be evaluated for future study.   Finally, while this paper 
may appear to target only those communities and 
business/legal practices where a visual “seal culture” 
applies, the visualisation of modern digital signatures is 
also appropriate within cross-culture communities, just as 
traditional seals are universal.   
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